cross-posted from: https://lemmy.today/post/28904943

Date: May 2025 Affected Regions: Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Yaroslavl, Tver, Tula, Nizhny Novgorod, Kaluga, Leningrad, Kursk, Mordovia (notably Saransk), and others. Confirmed Impact: Mobile internet partially or completely disabled across 30+ urban areas.

Official Narrative: “Security Measures” According to regional telecoms and unofficial channels, mobile internet services were intentionally cut off due to the threat of incoming Ukrainian drone strikes. Authorities cite “preventive action” and the need to limit open communications during heightened alert.

Reality Check: Tactical Blackout or Info Control? While defensive countermeasures against UAV threats are plausible, the scope and consistency of the outages raise questions. Independent observers and local reports suggest that the disruption may have also served to:

• Obscure real-time footage of military or infrastructural damage.
• Prevent citizens from coordinating information during attacks.
• Suppress potential unrest or panic in targeted regions.
• Mask technological vulnerabilities in regional air defense systems.

Strategic Implications:

• Operational transparency within the Russian Federation continues to decline.
• Digital infrastructure is increasingly weaponized as a tool of internal control.
• Civilian communication tools are deprioritized in favor of regime stability narratives.

The situation highlights a key paradox: While the Kremlin projects strength through cyber capabilities and digital sovereignty, it is simultaneously cutting its own population off from the global information sphere whenever reality threatens to contradict the official line.

Broader Context: These shutdowns occur alongside:

• Russia’s ongoing struggle with technological sanctions, including deteriorating access to Western telecom hardware.
• Failures of domestic tech replacements (e.g., the collapse of “Rossgram,” billed as a Russian alternative to Instagram).
• Escalating cross-border drone warfare, now reaching the interior of the country.

Sources:

• Local media reports
• Telecom user data (indirect confirmations from VK/TG channels)
• Internet monitoring watchdogs (e.g., NetBlocks, IsDown)
• Satellite imagery and OSINT (to be updated)

Hashtags: #Russia #UAV #DroneWarfare #InternetShutdown #DigitalAuthoritarianism #Censorship #InfoControl #CyberWarfare #FediverseReports #OSINT