The armed uprising by the Syrian population was the 2011 insurgency, which ended in massacres of civilians. Following that, part of the Syrian army defected and formed the FSA. The civil war was an army vs army proper war, not a popular insurgency, there were no “civilians with guns” fighting, only trained military.
The Houthis are a very well organized movement with a lot of external funding and backing, it’s much more than a popular uprising (although it does have the support of the population). The people fighting that civil are were trained military, not civilians with guns who decided to fire back at an oppressor. It’s really a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
I’m sorry but I think you just aren’t well informed enough on geopolitics to be discussing these topics. I don’t mean this in an offensive way, but these topics are much more complex than “government vs the people”, there’s multiple sides and external third parties to all the conflicts you are describing in extremely simplistic ways, none of which look anything like a country’s population using its guns to fight against its own military.
The armed uprising by the Syrian population was the 2011 insurgency, which ended in massacres of civilians. Following that, part of the Syrian army defected and formed the FSA.
It didn’t “end;” the FSA formed against the backdrop of increasingly militant anti-government resistance. Hell, the first defections from the Syrian army predate the formation of the FSA by months.
The civil war was an army vs army proper war, not a popular insurgency, there were no “civilians with guns” fighting, only trained military.
I mean, yes, because “civilians with guns” is what a failed uprising looks like. If the government doesn’t fold, a popular uprising’s main immediate goal is to become a proper army. The Syrian civil war is what it looks like when a (particularly gruesome) uprising gets off the ground.
The Houthis are a very well organized movement with a lot of external funding and backing, it’s much more than a popular uprising
Definitely, but again the organization and external funding and backing came during the years of insurgency and civil war. It’s not like they spawned in 2004 with 300k armed men.
It’s really a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Yes, but it didn’t start as a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Anyway my point here is: A sustainable armed uprising will very quickly stop looking like an armed uprising. Of course it’ll seem like popular uprisings don’t work if when a popular uprising works you retroactively classify it as something else. I know that the Syrian or Yemeni civil wars don’t boil down to “government vs people,” but that’s (sort of, with a hundred footnotes) how they started.
The armed uprising by the Syrian population was the 2011 insurgency, which ended in massacres of civilians. Following that, part of the Syrian army defected and formed the FSA. The civil war was an army vs army proper war, not a popular insurgency, there were no “civilians with guns” fighting, only trained military.
The Houthis are a very well organized movement with a lot of external funding and backing, it’s much more than a popular uprising (although it does have the support of the population). The people fighting that civil are were trained military, not civilians with guns who decided to fire back at an oppressor. It’s really a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
I’m sorry but I think you just aren’t well informed enough on geopolitics to be discussing these topics. I don’t mean this in an offensive way, but these topics are much more complex than “government vs the people”, there’s multiple sides and external third parties to all the conflicts you are describing in extremely simplistic ways, none of which look anything like a country’s population using its guns to fight against its own military.
It didn’t “end;” the FSA formed against the backdrop of increasingly militant anti-government resistance. Hell, the first defections from the Syrian army predate the formation of the FSA by months.
I mean, yes, because “civilians with guns” is what a failed uprising looks like. If the government doesn’t fold, a popular uprising’s main immediate goal is to become a proper army. The Syrian civil war is what it looks like when a (particularly gruesome) uprising gets off the ground.
Definitely, but again the organization and external funding and backing came during the years of insurgency and civil war. It’s not like they spawned in 2004 with 300k armed men.
Yes, but it didn’t start as a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Anyway my point here is: A sustainable armed uprising will very quickly stop looking like an armed uprising. Of course it’ll seem like popular uprisings don’t work if when a popular uprising works you retroactively classify it as something else. I know that the Syrian or Yemeni civil wars don’t boil down to “government vs people,” but that’s (sort of, with a hundred footnotes) how they started.
Actually… of all the people who argued back, you’re the one who found the middle ground to agree on.
Your description of an armed uprising is indeed the ideal scenario, and does fit historical caser.
I just don’t believe in its feasability against a hyper militarized modern imperial state.